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Abstract—Malicious websites are a major cyber attack vector,
and effective detection of them is an important cyber defense task.
The main defense paradigm in this regard is that the defender
uses some kind of machine learning algorithms to train a detection
model, which is then used to classify websites in question. Unlike
other settings, the following issue is inherent to the problem of
malicious websites detection: the attacker essentially has access
to the same data that the defender uses to train his/her detection
models. This ‘symmetry’ can be exploited by the attacker, at least
in principle, to evade the defender’s detection models. In this
paper, we present a framework for characterizing the evasion
and counter-evasion interactions between the attacker and the
defender, where the attacker attempts to evade the defender’s
detection models by taking advantage of this symmetry. Within
this framework, we show that an adaptive attacker can make
malicious websites evade powerful detection models, but proactive
training can be an effective counter-evasion defense mechanism.
The framework is geared toward the popular detection model of
decision tree, but can be adapted to accommodate other classifiers.
Index Terms—Malicious websites, static analysis, dynamic anal-
ysis, evasion, adaptive attacks, proactive training.
I. INTRODUCTION
Compromising websites and abusing them to launch further
attacks (e.g., drive-by-download [7], [20]) have become one of
the mainstream attack vectors. Unfortunately, it is infeasible, if
not impossible, to completely eliminate such attacks, meaning
that we must have competent solutions that can detect com-
promised/malicious websites as soon as possible. The dynamic
approach, which is often based on client honeypots or variants,
can detect malicious websites with high accuracy, but is limited
in terms of its scalability. The static approach, which often ana-
lyzes the website contents and then uses some detection models
(e.g., decision trees) to classify them into benign/malicious
classes, is very efficient, but suffers from its limited success in
dealing with sophisticated attacks (e.g. JavaScript obfuscation).
This hints that there is perhaps some inherent limitation in the
trade-off between scalability and detection effectiveness.
In this paper, we bring up another dimension of the problem,
which may have a fundamental impact on the aforementioned
inherent limitation. Unlike in other settings, the following issue
is inherent to the problem of malicious websites detection:
The attacker essentially has access to the same data that the
defender uses to train its detection models. This ‘symmetry’
could be exploited by the attacker to evade the defender’s
detection models. This is because the attacker can effectively
train and obtain (almost) the same detection models, and then
exploit them to make other malicious websites evasive. This is
possible because the attacker can manipulate the contents of
malicious websites during the course of compromising them,
or after they are compromised but before they are analyzed by
the defender’s detection models. This is feasible because the
attacker controls the malicious websites.
More specifically, we make two contributions. First, we pro-
pose a framework for characterizing the evasion and counter-
evasion interactions between the attacker and the defender. The
framework accommodates a set of adaptive attacks against a
class of detection models known as decision trees [22], which
have been widely used in this problem domain. The framework
also accommodates the novel idea of proactive training as
the counter-evasion mechanism against the adaptive attacks,
where the defender proactively trains its detection models
while taking adaptive attacks into consideration. Although the
framework is geared towards decision trees, it can be adapted
to accommodate other kinds of classifiers.
Second, we use a dataset that was collected during the span
of 40 days to evaluate the evasion power of adaptive attacks
and the counter-evasion effectiveness of proactive training.
Experimental results show that an adaptive attacker can make
malicious websites evade powerful detection models, but proac-
tive training can be an effective counter-evasion defense mech-
anism. In order to deepen our understanding of the evasion and
counter-evasion interactions, we also investigate which features
(or attributes) of websites have a high security significance,
namely that their manipulation causes the misclassification
of malicious websites. Surprisingly, we find that the features
of high security significance are almost different from the
features that would be selected by the standard feature selection
algorithms. This suggests that we might need to design new
machine learning algorithms to best fit the domain of security
problems. Moreover, we find that the detection accuracy of
proactively-trained detection models increases with the degree
of the defender’s proactiveness (i.e. the number of training
iterations). Finally, we find that if the defender does not know
the attacker’s adaptation strategy, the defender should adopt the
full adaptation strategy that will be described later.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
briefly reviews the context of the present study. Section III
investigates the framework of evasion and counter-evasion
interactions. Section IV evaluates the effectiveness of the
framework. Section V discusses related prior work. Section VI
concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In order to illustrate the power of adaptive attacks and the
effectiveness of our counter-measure against them, we need to
consider some concrete detection scheme. Since J48 classifiers
are known to be successful in detecting malicious websites [3],
[29], [30], [15], [6], [14], we adopt the detection scheme we
proposed in [30] as the starting point of the present study. We
showed in [30] that J48 classifier outperforms Naive Bayes,
Logistic and SVM classifiers.
We also inherit the data collection method described in
[30]. At a high level, a crawler is used to fetch the website
content corresponding to an input URL, benign and mali-
cious alike. Each URL is described by 105 application-layer
features and 19 network-layer features [30]. We now briefly
review the following 16 features that will be encountered
later: URL_length (length of URL); Content_length
(the content-length field in HTTP header, which may be ma-
nipulated by malicious websites); #Redirect (number of
redirects); #Scripts (number of scripts); #Embedded_URL
(number of URLs embedded); #Special_character
(number of special characters in a URL); #Iframe (number
of iframes); #JS_function (number of JavaScript func-
tions in a website); #Long_string (number of strings
with 51 or more letters in embedded JavaScript pro-
grams); #Src_app_bytes (number of bytes communi-
cated from crawler to website); #Local_app_packet
(number of crawler-to-website IP packets, including redi-
rects and DNS queries); Dest_app_bytes (volume of
website-to-crawler communications); Duration (the time
it takes for the crawler to fetch the contents of a web-
site, including rediects); #Dist_remote_tcp_port and
#Dist_remote_IP (number of distinct TCP ports and
IP addresses the crawler uses to fetch websites con-
tents, respectively); #DNS_query (number of DNS queries);
#DNS_answer (number of DNS server’s responses).
The main notations are summarized as follows.
MLA machine learning algorithm
fv feature vector representing a website
Xz feature Xz’s domain is [minz,maxz]
M0, . . . ,Mγ defender’s detection schemes (e.g., J48 classifier)
D′0 training data (feature vectors) for learning M0
D0 D0 = D0.malicious∪D0.benign, where mali-
cious feature vectors in D0.malicious may have
been manipulated
D
†
0
feature vectors used by defender to proactively
train M1, . . . ,Mγ ; D†0 = D
†
0
.malicious ∪
D
†
0
.benign
α, γ number of adaptation iterations
Mi(Dα) applying detection scheme Mi to classify feature
vectors Dα
M0-γ(Dα) majority vote of M0(Dα), . . . ,Mγ(Dα)
ST,C,F adaptation strategy ST, manipulation algorithm
F, manipulation constraints C
s
R
← S assigning s as a random member of set S
III. EVASION AND COUNTER-EVASION FRAMEWORK
Adaptive attacks are possible because an attacker can collect
the same data as what is used by the defender to train a
detection scheme. The attacker also knows the machine learning
algorithm(s) the defender uses or even the defender’s detection
scheme. To accommodate the worst-case scenario, we assume
there is a single attacker that coordinates the compromise of
websites (possibly by many sub-attackers). This means that
the attacker knows which websites are malicious, while the
defender aims to detect them. In order to evade detection, the at-
tacker can manipulate some features of the malicious websites.
The manipulation operations can take place during the course
of compromising websites, or after compromising websites but
before they are classified by the defender’s detection scheme.
A. Framework Overview
We describe adaptive attacks and countermeasures in a
modular fashion, by using eight algorithms whose caller-callee
relation is highlighted in Figure 1. Algorithm 1 is the attacker’s
main algorithm, which calls Algorithm 2 for preprocessing,
and calls Algorithm 4 or Algorithm 5 for selecting features
to manipulate and for determining the manipulated values for
the selected features. Both Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 5 call
Algorithm 3 to compute the escape intervals for the features
that are to be manipulated. An escape interval defines the
interval from which the manipulated value of a feature should
be taken so as to evade detection.
Algorithm1: 
Adaptive Attack (AA)
Algorithm 2: 
Preprocessing (PP)
Algorithm 3: Computing 
Escape_Interval (Escape)
Algorithm 4 & 5: 
Manipulation (F1 & F2)
Algorithm 6:
Proactive Detection (PD)
Algorithm 7:
Proactive Training (PT)
Algorithm 8: Evaluation (Eva)
Fig. 1. Caller-callee relation between the algorithms.
Algorithm 6 is the defender’s main algorithm, which calls
Algorithm 7 for proactive training of detection schemes. For
this purpose, the defender can have access to its own proactive
manipulation algorithm. In our experiments, we let the defender
have access to the manipulations algorithms that are available
to the attacker, namely Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 5. This is
sufficient for the purpose of understanding the effectiveness of
proactive training and detection against adaptive attacks under
various algorithm/parameter possibilities, such as: the defender
correctly or incorrectly “guess” the manipulation algorithm or
parameters that are used by the attacker, and the relatively more
effective proactive training strategy against a class of adaptive
attacks. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of proactive
training and detection against adaptive attacks, we use an
“artificial” Algorithm 8, which is often implicit in most real-life
defense operations.
B. Evasion Model and Algorithms
In our model, a website is represented by a feature vector.
We call the feature vector representing a benign website benign
feature vector, and the feature vector representing a malicious
website malicious feature vector. Denote by D′0 the defender’s
training data, namely a set of feature vectors corresponding
to a set of benign websites (denoted by D′0.benign) and
malicious websites (denoted by D′0.malicious). The defender
uses a machine learning algorithm MLA to learn a detection
scheme M0 from D′0 (i.e., M0 is learned from one portion
of D′0 and tested via the other portion of D′0). As mentioned
above, the attacker is given M0 to accommodate the worst-
case scenario. Denote by D0 the set of feature vectors that
are to be classified by M0 to determine which feature vectors
(i.e., the corresponding websites) are malicious. The attacker’s
objective is to manipulate the malicious feature vectors in D0
into some Dα so that M0(Dα) has a high false-negative rate,
where α > 0 represents the number of iterations (or rounds)
the attacker conducts the manipulation operations.
Algorithm 1 Adaptive attack AA(MLA,M0, D0, ST,C,F, α)
INPUT:M0 is defender’s detection scheme, D0 = D0.malicious ∪
D0.benign where malicious feature vectors (D0.malicious) are to be
manipulated (to evade detection of M0), ST is attacker’s adaptation
strategy, C is a set of manipulation constraints, F is attacker’s manip-
ulation algorithm, α is attacker’s number of adaptation rounds
OUTPUT: Dα
1: initialize array D1, . . . , Dα
2: for i=1 to α do
3: if ST == parallel-adaptation then
4: Di ← F(M0, D0,C) {manipulated version of D0}
5: else if ST == sequential-adaptation then
6: Di ← F(Mi−1, Di−1,C) {manipulated version of D0}
7: else if ST == full-adaptation then
8: Di−1 ← PP(D0, . . . , Di−2) {see Algorithm 2}
9: Di ← F(Mi−1,Di−1,C) {manipulated version of D0}
10: end if
11: if i < α then
12: Mi ← MLA(Di) {D1, . . . , Dα−1,M1, . . . ,Mα−1 are not
used when ST==parallel-adaptation}
13: end if
14: end for
15: return Dα
Algorithm 1 describes the adaptive attack. As highlighted in
Figure 2, we consider three basic adaptation strategies.
• ST == parallel-adaptation: The attacker sets the
manipulated Di = F(M0, D0,C), where i = 1, . . . , α, and
F is a randomized manipulation algorithm, meaning that
Di = Dj for i 6= j is unlikely.
• ST == sequential-adaptation: The attacker sets
the manipulated Di = F(Mi−1, Di−1,C) for i = 1, . . . , α,
where detection schemes M1, . . . ,Mα are respectively
learned from D1, . . . , Dα using the defender’s machine
learning algorithm MLA (also known to the attacker).
• ST == full-adaptation: The attacker sets the ma-
nipulated Di = F(Mi−1,PP(D0, . . . , Di−1),C) for i =
1, 2, . . ., where PP(·, . . .) is a preprocessing algorithm for
“aggregating” sets of feature vectors D0, D1, . . . into a
single set of feature vectors, F is a manipulation algorithm,
M1, . . . ,Mα are learned respectively from D1, . . . , Dα by
the attacker.
Algorithm 2 is a concrete preprocessing algorithm. Its basic
idea is the following: since each malicious website corresponds
to m malicious feature vectors that respectively belong to
D0, . . . , Dm−1, the preprocessing algorithm randomly picks
one of the m malicious feature vectors to represent the ma-
licious website in D. It is worth mentioning that one can
derive some hybrid attack strategies from the above three
basic strategies. We also note that the attack strategies and
the manipulation constraints are independent of the detection
schemes, but the manipulation algorithms would be specific to
the detection schemes.
Algorithm 2 Preprocessing PP(D0, . . . , Dm−1)
INPUT: m sets of feature vectors D0, . . . , Dm−1
where the zth malicious website corresponds to
D0.malicious[z], . . . , Dm−1.malicious[z]
OUTPUT: D
1: D ← ∅
2: size ← sizeof(D0.malicious)
3: for z = 1 to size do
4: D[z] R← {D0.malicious[z], . . . , Dm−1.malicious[z]}
5: D ← D ∪D0.benign
6: end for
7: return D
Manipulation Constraints. For a feature X whose value
is to be manipulated, the attacker needs to compute
X.escape interval, which is a subset of feature X’s domain
domain(X) and can possibly cause the malicious feature
vector to evade detection. Feature X’s manipulated value is
randomly chosen from its escapte interval, which is calcu-
lated using Algorithm 3, while taking as input X’s domain
constraints and semantics constraints.
Algorithm 3 X’s escape interval Escape(X,M,C)
INPUT: X is feature for manipulation, M is detection scheme, C
represents constraints
OUTPUT: X’s escape interval
1: domain constraint← C.domain map(X)
2: semantics constraint ← C.semantics map(X) {∅ if X
cannot be manipulate due to semantics constraints}
3: escape interval ← domain constraint ∩
semantics constraint
4: return escape interval
Algorithm 3 is called because the manipulation algorithm
needs to compute the interval from which a feature’s manip-
ulated value should be taken. Specifically, the constraints are
the following.
• Domain constraints: Each feature has its own domain
of possible values. This means that the new value of a
feature after manipulation must fall into the domain of
the feature. Let C.domain map be a table of (key, value)
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Fig. 2. Adaptive attack algorithm AA(MLA,M0, D0, ST,C, F, α), where D′0 is the defender’s training data, M0 is the defender’s detection scheme that
is learned from D′
0
by using MLA, D0 is the feature vectors that are examined by M0 in the absence of adaptive attacks, ST is the attacker’s adaptation
strategy, C is a set of manipulation constraints, F is the attacker’s (deterministic or randomized) manipulation algorithm that maintains the set of constraints C,
α is the number of rounds the attacker runs its manipulation algorithms. Dα is the manipulated version of D0 with malicious feature vectors D0.malicious
manipulated. The attacker’s objective is make M0(Dα) have high false-negative rate.
pairs, where key is feature name and value is the feature’s
domain constraint. Let C.domain map(X) return feature
X’s domain as defined in C.domain map.
• Semantics constraints: The manipulation of feature val-
ues should have no side-effect to the attack, or at least
cannot invalidate the attacks. For example, if a mali-
cious website needs to use script to launch the drive-
by-download attack, the feature indicating the number of
scripts cannot be manipulated to 0. Let C.semantics map
be a table of (key, value) pairs, where key is feature
name and value is the feature’s semantics constraints.
Let C.semantics map(X) return feature X’s semantics
constraints as specified in C.attack map.
In general, constraints might have to be manually identified
based on feature definitions and domain knowledge.
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Fig. 3. Example J48 classifier and feature manipulation. For inner node v10 on
the benign path ending at benign leaf v3, we have v10.feature = “X4”
and v10.feature.value = X4.value.
Manipulation Algorithms. As mentioned in Section II, we
adopt the J48 classifier detection scheme, where a J48 classifier
is trained by concatenating the application- and network-layer
features corresponding to the same URL [30]. We present two
manipulation algorithms, called F1 and F2, which exploit the
defender’s J48 classifier to guide the manipulation of features.
Both algorithms neither manipulate the benign feature vectors
(which are not controlled by the attacker), nor manipulate
the malicious feature vectors that are already classified as
benign by the defender’s detection scheme (i.e., false-negative).
Both algorithms may fail, while brute-forcing may fail as well
because of the manipulation constraints.
Since the manipulation algorithms are inevitably compli-
cated, in the following we will present their basic ideas and
sketched algorithms. The notations used in the algorithms are:
for node v in the classifier, v.feature is the feature associated
to node v, and v.value is v.feature’s “branching” value
as specified by the classifier (a binary tree with all features
numericalized).
Manipulation Algorithm F1 is described as Algorithm 4.
The basic idea underlying this manipulation algorithm is the
following: for every malicious feature vector in D, there is a
unique path (in the J48 classifier M ) that leads to a malicious
leaf, which indicates that the feature vector is malicious. We
call the path leading to malicious leaf a malicious path, and the
path leading to a benign leaf (which indicates a feature vector
as benign) a benign path.
By examining the path from the malicious leaf to the root,
say malicious leaf → v2 → . . . → root, and identifying
the first inner node, namely v2, the algorithm attempts to
manipulate fv.(v2.feature).value so that the classification can
lead to malicious leaf ’s sibling, say v2,another child, which
is guaranteed to exist (otherwise, v2 cannot be an inner node).
Note that there must be a sub-path rooted at v2,another child
that leads to a benign leaf (otherwise, v2 cannot be an
inner node as well), and that manipulation of values of the
features corresponding to the nodes on the sub-tree rooted at
Algorithm 4 Manipulation algorithm F1(M,D,C)
INPUT: J48 classifier M , feature vector set D(malicious ∪ benign),
manipulation constraints C
OUTPUT: manipulated feature vectors
1: for all feature vector ∈ D.malicious do
2: v be the root node of M
3: maintain an interval for every feature in feature vector.
4: while v is not benign leaf do
5: if v is an inner node then
6: v ← v.Child based on decision tree rule
7: update corresponding feature interval
8: else if v is a malicious leaf then
9: compute the corresponding feature’s escape interval by
calling Algorithm 3
10: pick a value z in the escape interval uniformly at random
11: set the corresponding feature’s value to z
12: v ← v.sibling
13: end if
14: end while
15: end for
16: return manipulated feature vectors D
v2,another child will preserve the postfix v2 → . . .→ root.
To help understand the manipulation algorithm, let
us look at one example. At a high-level, the attacker
runs AA(“J48”,M0, D0, ST,C,F1, α = 1) and therefore
F1(M0, D0,C) to manipulate the feature vectors, where ST
can be any of the three strategies because they cause no
difference when α = 1 (see Figure 2). Consider the example
J48 classifier M in Figure 3, where features and their values
are for illustration purpose, and the leaves are decision nodes
with class 0 indicating benign leaves and 1 indicating malicious
leaves. A website with feature vector
(X4 = −1, X9 = 5, X16 = 5, X18 = 5)
is classified as malicious because it leads to decision path
v0
X9≤13
−−−−→ v10
X4≤0
−−−−→ v9
X9≤7
−−−−→ v1,
which ends at malicious leaf v1. The manipulation algorithm
first identifies malicious leaf v1’s parent node v9, and manip-
ulates X9’s value to fit into v1’s sibling (v8). Note that X9’s
escape interval is as:
([min9,max9] \ [min9, 7]) ∩ [min9, 13] = (7, 13],
where Domain(X9) = [min9,max9], [min9, 7] corresponds to
node v9 on the path, and [min0, 13] corresponds to node v0
on the path. The algorithm manipulates X9’s value to be a
random element from X9’s escapte interval, say 8 ∈ (7, 13],
which causes the manipulated feature vector to evade detection
because of decision path:
v0
X9≤13
−−−−→ v10
X4≤0
−−−−→ v9
X9>7−−−−→ v8
X16≤9.1
−−−−−→ v7
X18>2.3−−−−−→ v3
and ends at benign leaf v3.
Manipulation Algorithm F2 is described as Algorithm 5.
The basic idea underlying this manipulation algorithm is to
first extract all benign paths. For each feature vector fv ∈
D.malicious, F2 keeps track of the mismatches between fv
and all benign paths. The algorithm attempts to manipulate as
few “mismatched” features as possible to evade M .
Algorithm 5 Manipulation algorithm F2(M,D,C)
INPUT: J48 classifier M , feature vector set D(malicious ∪ benign),
manipulation constraints C
OUTPUT: manipulated feature vectors
1: create interval vector for features along every benign path and
store in Paths.
2: for all feature vector ∈ D.malicious do
3: for all Path ∈ Paths do
4: compare feature vector to Path and record the mismatch
feature number
5: end for
6: sort Paths in ascending order of mismatch feature number
7: for all Path ∈ Paths until successfully manipulated do
8: for all mismatch feature ∈ Paths do
9: get escape interval by calling Algorithm 3
10: pick a value n in escape interval at random
11: set feature vector’s corresponding feature value to n
12: end for
13: end for
14: end for
15: return manipulated feature vectors D
To help understand this manipulation algorithm, let us look
at another example. Consider feature vector
(X4 = .3, X9 = 5.3, X16 = 7.9, X18 = 2.1, X10 = 3, X1 = 2.3),
which is classified as malicious because of path
v0
X9≤13
−−−−→ v10
X4>0−−−−→ v4.
To evade detection, the attacker can compare the feature vector
to the matrix of two benign paths. For the benign path v3 →
v7 → v8 → v9 → v10 → v0, the feature vector has three
mismatches, namely features X4, X9, X18. For the benign path
v13 → v11 → v12 → v0, the feature vector has two mismatches,
namely X9 and X1. The algorithm first processes the benign
path ending at node v13. The algorithm will try to manipulate
X9 and X1’s values to reach the benign leaf. Suppose on the
other hand, that X10 cannot be manipulated without violating
the constraints. The algorithm stops with this benign path and
considers the benign path end at node v3. If the algorithm fails
with this benign path again, the algorithm will not manipulate
the feature vector and leave it to be classified as malicious.
C. Counter-Evasion Algorithms
We have showed that adaptive attacks can ruin the defender’s
(non-proactive) detection schemes. Now we investigate counter-
measure against adaptive attacks. The counter-measure is based
on the idea of proactive training & detection. Algorithm 6
describes the proactive detection algorithm. The basic idea of
this algorithm is to call the proactive training algorithm to
generate a set of proactively trained detection schemes, denoted
by M †1 , . . . ,M †γ . These detection schemes are derived from,
among other things, M0, which is learned from D′0 using MLA.
It is important to note that D′0 = D′0.benign∪D′0.malicious,
Algorithm 6 Proactive detection
PD(MLA,M0, D
†
0, Dα, STD,C,FD, γ)
INPUT: M0 is learned from D′0 using MLA, D†0 = D
†
0
.benign ∪
D
†
0
.malicious, Dα (α unknown to defender) is set of feature vec-
tors for classification (where the malicious websites may have been
manipulated by the attacker), STD is defender’s adaptation strategy,
FD is defender’s manipulation algorithm, C is set of constraints, γ is
defender’s number of adaptations rounds
OUTPUT: malicious vectors fv ∈ Dα
1: M†
1
, . . . ,M†γ ← PT(MLA,M0, D
†
0
,STD,C,FD, γ) {see Algo-
rithm 7}
2: malicious← ∅
3: for all fv ∈ Dα do
4: if (M0(fv) says fv is malicious) OR (majority of
M0(fv),M
†
1
(fv), . . . ,M†γ(fv) say fv is malicious) then
5: malicious← malicious ∪ {fv}
6: end if
7: end for
8: return malicious
where D′0.benign is a set of websites that are known to
be benign (ground truth) and cannot be manipulated by the
attacker, D′0.malicious is a set of websites that are known
to be malicious (ground truth). A website is classified as
malicious if the non-proactive detection scheme M0 classifies it
as malicious, or at least ⌊(γ+1)/2⌋+1 of the proactively trained
detection schemes classify it as malicious. This is meditated to
accommodate that the defender does not know a priori whether
the attacker is adaptive or not, When the attacker is not adaptive,
M0 can effectively deal with D0.
Algorithm 7 describes the proactive training algorithm. This
algorithm is similar to the adaptive attack algorithm AA because
it also consider three kinds of adaptation strategies. Specifically,
this algorithm aims to derive detection schemes M †1 , . . . ,M †γ
from the starting-point detection scheme M0.
Algorithm 7 Proactive training
PT(MLA,M0, D
†
0, STD,C,FD, γ)
INPUT: same as in Algorithm 6
OUTPUT: M†
1
, . . . ,M†γ
1: M†
0
←M0 {for simplifying notations}
2: initialize D†
1
, . . . , D†γ and M†1 , . . . ,M†γ respectively as empty sets
and empty classifiers
3: for i=1 to γ do
4: if STD == parallel-adaptation then
5: D†i .malicious← FD(M
†
0
, D
†
0
.malicious,C)
6: else if STD == sequential-adaptation then
7: D†i .malicious← FD(M
†
i−1, D
†
i−1.malicious,C)
8: else if STD == full-adaptation then
9: D†i−1.malicious← PP(D
†
0
, . . . , D
†
i−2)
10: D†i .malicious← FD(M
†
i−1,D
†
i−1,C)
11: end if
12: D†i .benign← D
†
0
.benign
13: M†i ← MLA(D
†
i )
14: end for
15: return M†
1
, . . . ,M†γ
Algorithm 8 describes the algorithm for evaluating the ef-
fectiveness of the counter-measure against the adaptive attacks.
Algorithm 8 Proactive defense vs. adaptive attack evaluation
Eva(MLA,M0, D
†
0, D0, STA,FA, STD,FD,C, α, γ)
INPUT: detection scheme M0 (learned from D′0, as in Algorithm 7),
D
†
0
is set of feature vectors for defender’s proactive training, D0 =
D0.malicious ∪ D0.benign, STA (STD) is attacker’s (defender’s)
adaptation strategy, FA (FD) is attacker’s (defender’s) manipulation
algorithm, C is the constraints, α (γ) is the number of attacker’s
(defender’s) adaptation rounds
OUTPUT: ACC, FN, TP and FP
1: if α > 0 then
2: Dα ← AA(MLA,M0, D0,STA,C,FA, α)
{call Algorithm 1}
3: end if
4: M†
1
, . . . ,M†γ ← PT(MLA,M0, D
†
0
,STD,C,FD, γ)
{call Algorithm 7}
5: malicious← PD(MLA,M0, D†0, Dα,STD,C, FD, γ)
{call Algorithm 6}
6: benign← Dα \malicious
7: calculate ACC, FN, TP and FP w.r.t. D0
8: return ACC, FN, TP and FP
Essentially, the evaluation algorithm calls the defender’s protec-
tion detection to generate a set of proactively trained detection
schemes, and calls the attacker’s adaptive attack algorithm
to manipulate the malicious websites (i.e., selecting some of
their features and manipulating their values to evade a given
detection scheme). By varying the adaptation strategies and
the parameters, we can evaluate the effectiveness of proactive
training & detection against the adaptive attacks. The param-
eter space of the evaluation algorithm includes at least 108
scenarios: the basic adaptation strategy space STA × STD is
3×3 (i.e., not counting any hybrids of parallel-adaptation,
sequential-adaptation and full-adapatation), the ma-
nipulation algorithm space FA×FB is 2×2, and the adaptation
round parameter space is at least 3 (α >,=, < γ).
IV. EVALUATING EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
COUNTER-EVASION ALGORITHMS
We use the standard metrics, including false-negative and
false-positive rates [30], to evaluate the effectiveness of counter-
evasion algorithms.
A. Data Description
The dataset used in this paper consists of a 40-
day URLs. Malicious URLs are downloaded from
blacklists: compuweb.com/url-domain-bl.txt, malware.com.br,
malwaredomainlist.com, zeustracker.abuse.ch and
spyeyetracker.abuse.ch and further confirmed with the
high-interaction client honeypot Capture-HPC[24]. Benign
URLs are obtained from alexa.com, which lists the top 10,000
websites that are supposed to be well protected. The test
of blacklist URLs using high-interaction client honeypot
confirmed our observation that some or many blacklist URLs
are not accessible any more and thus should not be counted as
malicious URLs.
The daily average number of malicious websites listed in
blacklists is 6763 and the daily average number of malicious
websites after being verified by Capture-HPC is 838. The total
number of distinct malicious websites we found in 40 days
are 17091. The daily average number of benign websites is
10,000. By eliminating non-accessible benign websites, the
daily average number of benign websites is 9501 in 40 days.
According to [26] and our experiment results, it can achieve
best detection rate, when the rate between the number of benign
websites and malicious websites are 4:1. So we choose all
malicious websites and 4 times of benign websites as our
training and testing data.
B. Effectiveness of the Evasion Attacks
Table I summarizes the results of adaptive attack
AA(“J48”,M0, D0, ST,C,F, α = 1) based on the 40-day
dataset mentioned above. The experiment can be more suc-
cinctly represented as M0(D1), meaning that the defender is
static (or non-proactive) and the attacker is adaptive with α = 1,
where D1 is the manipulated version of D0. Note that in the
case of α = 1, the three adaptation strategies lead to the
same D1 as shown in Figure 2. From Table I, we find that
both manipulation algorithms can effectively evade detection
by manipulating on average 4.31-7.23 features while achieving
false-negative rate 87.6%-94.7% for F1, and by manipulating
on average 4.01-6.19 features while achieving false-negative
rate 89.1%-95.3% for F2
TABLE I
EXPERIMENT RESULTS WITH M0(D1) IN TERMS OF AVERAGE
FALSE-NEGATIVE RATE (FN), AVERAGE NUMBER OF MANIPULATED
FEATURES (#MF), AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF FAILED ATTEMPTS (FA).
F1 F2
Detection Scheme FN #MF FA FN #MF FA
J48 Decision Tree 87.6% 7.23 12.6% 89.1% 6.19 11.0%
Having observed the phenomenon that manipulation of some
features’ values can essentially make the detection schemes
useless, it would be natural to ask which features are often
manipulated for evasion? To look into the question, we notice
that many features are manipulated over the 40 days, but only
a few are manipulated often.
F1 most often (i.e., > 150 times each day for over
the 40 days) manipulates three application-layer features
— URL_length, Content_length, #Embedded_URLs
— and two network-layer features — Duration and
#Local_app_packet. On the other hand, F2 most often
(i.e., > 150 times) manipulates two application-layer features
— #Special_characters and Content_length —
and one network-layer feature — Duration.
The above discrepancy between the frequencies that features
are manipulated can be attributed to the design of the manipu-
lation algorithms. Specifically, F1 seeks to manipulate features
that are associated to nodes that are close to the leaves. In
contrast, F2 emphasizes on the mismatches between a malicious
feature vector and an entire benign path, which represents a
kind of global search and also explains why F2 manipulates
fewer features.
We also want to know why these features have such
high security/evasion significance? The issue is important
because identifying the “important” features could lead to
deeper insights. We compare the manipulated features to the
features that would be selected by a feature selection algorithm
for the purpose of training classifiers. To be specific, we use
the InfoGain feature selection algorithm because it ranks the
contributions of individual features [30]. We find that among
the manipulated features, URL_length is the only feature
among the five InfoGain-selected application-layer features,
and #Dist_remote_TCP_port is the only feature among
the four InfoGain-selected network-layer features. This sug-
gests that the feature selection algorithm does not necessarily
offer good insights into the importance of features from a
security perspective.
The standard feature-selection algorithms are almost useless
to find indicative features from the perspective of evading
classifiers. There is still gap between our results and the
“optimal” solutions based on security semantics; it’s an open
problem to bridge the gap, because classifiers are “black-box”
that don’t really accommodate “security semantics” of features.
C. Effectiveness of the Counter-Evasion Algorithms
Table II summarizes the effectiveness of proactive defense
against adaptive attacks. We make the following observations.
First, if the defender is proactive (i.e., γ > 0) but the attacker
is non-adaptive (i.e., α = 0), the false-negative rate drops from
0.79% in the baseline case to some number belonging to inter-
val [0.23%, 0.56%]. The price is: the detection accuracy drops
from 99.68% in the baseline case to some number belonging
to interval [99.23%, 99.68%] the false-positive rate increases
from 0.14% in the baseline case to some number belonging
to interval [0.20%, 0.93%], The above observations suggest:
the defender can always use proactive detection without
worrying about side-effects (e.g., when the attacker is not
adaptive). This is because the proactive detection algorithm
PD uses M0(D0) as the first line of detection.
Second, when STA = STD 6= 0, it has a significant impact
whether or not they use the same manipulation algorithm. This
phenomenon also can be explained by that the features that are
often manipulated by F1 are very different from the features that
are often manipulated by F2. More specifically, when FA = FD,
the proactively learned classifiers M †1 , . . . ,M †γ would capture
the “maliciousness” information embedded in the manipulated
data Dα; this would not be true when FA 6= FD . Moreover, the
sequential adaptation strategy appears to be more “oblivious”
than the other two strategies in the sense that Dα preserves
less information about D0. what adaptation strategy should the
defender use to counter STA = sequential? Table III shows
that the attacker does not have an obviously more effective
counter full adaptation strategy. This hints that the full
strategy may be a kind of equilibrium strategy because both
attacker and defender have no significant gains by deviating
from it. This inspires an important problem for future research:
Is the full adaptation strategy (or variant of it) an
equilibrium strategy?
Third, Table II shows that when STD = STA, the attacker
can benefit by increasing its adaptiveness α. Table III exhibits
TABLE II
CROSS-LAYER PROACTIVE DETECTION WITH STA = STD . FOR BASELINE CASE M0(D0), ACC = 99.68%, TRUE-POSITIVE RATE TP =99.21%,
FALSE-NEGATIVE RATE FN=0.79%, AND FALSE-POSITIVE RATE FP=0.14%.
Strategy Manipulation algorithm M0-8(D0) M0-8(D1) M0-8(D9)ACC TP FN FP ACC TP FN FP ACC TP FN FP
STA = STD
FD = F1 vs. FA = F1 99.59 99.71 0.29 0.39 95.58 92.03 7.97 3.62 95.39 92.00 8.00 3.83
= parallel
FD = F1 vs. FA = F2 99.27 99.77 0.23 0.77 78.51 25.50 74.50 9.88 78.11 32.18 67.82 11.48
FD = F2 vs. FA = F1 99.16 99.76 0.24 0.93 76.33 19.32 80.68 11.17 78.96 39.77 60.23 12.14
FD = F2 vs. FA = F2 99.59 99.62 0.38 0.39 93.66 90.25 9.75 5.59 96.17 92.77 7.23 3.08
STA = STD
FD = F1 vs. FA = F1 99.52 99.69 0.31 0.45 93.44 77.48 22.52 3.05 92.04 59.33 30.67 2.99
= sequential
FD = F1 vs. FA = F2 99.23 99.70 0.30 0.82 74.24 20.88 79.22 14.06 79.43 30.03 69.97 9.38
FD = F2 vs. FA = F1 99.27 99.67 0.33 0.80 77.14 29.03 70.97 12.33 82.72 40.93 59.07 7.83
FD = F2 vs. FA = F2 99.52 99.53 0.47 0.50 93.44 78.70 21.30 2.10 92.04 62.30 37.70 2.11
STA = STD
FD = F1 vs. FA = F1 99.68 99.44 0.56 0.20 96.92 96.32 3.68 2.89 95.73 92.03 7.97 3.27
= full
FD = F1 vs. FA = F2 99.27 99.58 0.42 0.72 85.68 40.32 59.68 4.38 78.11 29.99 70.01 11.00
FD = F2 vs. FA = F1 99.60 99.66 0.34 0.40 85.65 51.84 48.16 6.93 87.61 72.99 27.01 9.01
FD = F2 vs. FA = F2 99.68 99.60 0.40 0.28 96.92 95.60 4.40 2.88 95.73 90.09 9.91 2.83
TABLE III
PROACTIVE DETECTION AGAINST ADAPTIVE ATTACKS WITH FD = FA . FOR THE BASELINE CASE M0(D0), WE HAVE ACC = 99.68%, TP =99.21%,
FN=0.79%, FP=0.14%.
STD vs. STA M0-γ(Dα)
STA = parallel STA = sequential STA = full
ACC TP FN FP ACC TP FN FP ACC TP FN FP
Manipulation algorithm FD = FA = F1
STD = parallel
M0-8(D1) 95.58 92.03 7.97 3.62 94.25 90.89 9.11 4.96 94.91 92.08 7.92 4.32
M0-8(D9) 95.39 92.00 8.00 3.83 92.38 80.03 19.97 4.89 93.19 84.32 15.68 4.54
STD = sequential
M0-8(D1) 92.15 74.22 25.78 3.93 93.44 77.48 22.52 3.05 92.79 76.32 23.68 3.07
M0-8(D9) 89.20 58.39 41.61 4.11 92.04 59.33 30.67 2.99 88.42 57.89 42.11 3.91
STD = full
M0-8(D1) 96.24 94.98 5.02 3.42 96.46 94.99 5.01 3.15 96.92 96.32 3.68 2.89
M0-8(D9) 94.73 90.01 9.99 4.21 94.70 90.03 9.97 4.23 95.73 92.03 7.97 3.27
Manipulation algorithm FD = FA = F2
STD = parallel
M0-8(D1) 93.66 90.25 9.75 5.59 94.25 88.91 11.09 3.98 94.91 89.77 10.23 3.53
M0-8(D9) 96.17 92.77 7.23 3.08 92.38 77.89 22.11 4.32 93.19 81.32 18.68 3.38
STA = sequential
M0-8(D1) 90.86 70.98 29.02 4.82 93.44 78.70 21.30 2.10 92.79 72.32 27.68 4.02
M0-8(D9) 88.43 53.32 46.68 3.97 92.04 62.30 37.70 2.11 88.42 57.88 42.12 3.17
STA = full
M0-8(D1) 95.69 93.89 6.11 3.88 96.46 94.98 5.02 3.03 96.92 95.60 4.40 2.88
M0-8(D9) 96.06 91.46 8.54 2.89 94.70 90.99 9.01 2.32 95.73 90.09 9.91 2.83
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(a) Fixed defender adaptation strategy against varying attacker adaptation strategies, where both the attacker and the defender use manipulation
algorithm F1. We observe that the FULL adaptation strategy leads to relatively better detection accuracy.
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(b) Fixed defender adaptation strategy against varying attacker adaptation strategies, where both the attacker and the defender use manipulation
algorithm F2. We observe that the FULL adaptation strategy leads to relatively better detection accuracy.
Fig. 4. Impact of defender’s proactiveness γ vs. attacker’s adaptiveness α on detection accuracy (average over the 40 days) under various “STD × STA”
combinations, where α ∈ [0, 8], γ ∈ [0, 9], PAR, SEQ and FULL respectively stand for parallel, sequential and full adaptation strategy, “SEQ vs. APR”
means STD = sequential and STA = parallel etc. Note that γ − α = a is averaged over all possible combinations of (α, γ) as long as α ∈ [0, 8] and
γ ∈ [0, 9], and that the detection accuracy is averaged over the 40 days. We observe that the detection accuracy in most cases there is a significant increase in
detection accuracy when the defender’s proactiveness matches the attacker’s adaptiveness.
the same phenomenon when STD 6= STA. In order to see the
impact of defender’s proactiveness as reflected by γ against
the defender’s adaptiveness as reflected by α, we plot in
Figure 4 how the detection accuracy with respect to (γ − α)
under the condition FD = FA and under various STD × STA
combinations. We observe that roughly speaking, as γ increases
to exceed the attacker’s adaptiveness α (i.e., γ changes from
γ < α to γ = α to γ > α), the detection accuracy may have
a significant increase at γ − α = 0. Moreover, we observe
that when STD = full, γ − α has no significant impact on
the detection accuracy. This suggest that the defender should
always use the full adaptation strategy to alleviate the
uncertainty about the attacker’s adaptiveness α.
V. RELATED WORK
The problem of malicious websites detection has been an
active research topic (e.g., [3], [5], [11]). The dynamic detection
approach has been investigated in [7], [31], [4], [12]. The static
detection approach has been investigated in [2], [6], [16]. The
hybrid dynamic-static approach has been investigated in [3],
[30], [9]. Loosely related to the problem of malicious websites
detection are the detection of Phishing websites [16], [17],
[10], the detection of spams [26], [28], [21], [16], [17], the
detection of suspicious URLs embedded in twitter message
streams [23], and the detection of browser-related attacks [25],
[13]. However, none of these studies considered the issue of
evasion by adaptive attackers.
The evasion attack is closely related to the problem of
adversarial machine learning, where the attacker aims to evade
an detection scheme that is derived from some machine learning
method [1], [27]. Perdisci et al. [19] investigated how to make
the detection harder to evade. Nelson et al. [18] assumed the
attacker has black-box access to the detection mechanism. Dalvi
et al. [8] used Game Theoretic method to study this problem
in the setting of spam detection by assuming the attacker has
access to the detection mechanism. Our model actually gives
attacker more freedom because the attacker knows the data
defender collected.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We formulated a model of adaptive attacks by which the
attacker can manipulate the malicious websites to evade detec-
tion. We also formulated a model of proactive defense against
the adaptive attacks. Experimental results based on a 40-day
dataset showed that adaptive attacks can evade non-proactive
defense, but can be effectively countered by proactive defense.
In the full version of the present paper, we will address
correlation constraints between features, which is omitted
due to space limitation. This study also introduces a set of
interesting research problems, including: Are the same kinds
of results/insights applicable to classifiers other than decision
trees? Is the full adaptation strategy indeed a kind of equi-
librium strategy? What is the optimal manipulation algorithm
(if exists)? How can we precisely characterize the evadability
caused by adaptive attacks in this context? What is the optimal
time resolution at which the defender should proactively train
its detection schemes (e.g., hour or day)?
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